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Homogenizing Difference:  Necessary Prejudices and the Rhetoric of Belonging 
 
 
Recent articles by leading European academics – for instance, those by Ulrich Beck1 
and Bernard-Henri Lévy2 – have, in the name of a championing of French culture or the 
evolution of the European post-nation state, emphasised the “differences” of Europe 
over against the character of the “sameness” of America, the staging of which appears 
to trans-Atlantic eyes to be exemplified by the hustings and conventions of the current 
primaries, where the distinctions between candidates seem less important than the 
repeated rhetoric of belongingness to a constructed and hoped-for unity of the United 
States. 
 
Beck’s “cosmopolitan tolerance” posits, not a toleration of difference by that which is 
inherently the “same”, but an active opening up to the “world of the Other, perceiving 
difference as an enrichment”, and exemplified on the one hand by the apparent 
retention of the concept of the nation state by America, and on the other the ditching 
of it by Europe.  Lévy argues not for any intrinsic superiority of French culture, but 
against the homogenisation of the concept of “global significance” (the words of Time 
magazine), especially in so far as this is equated with a significance to American 
capital. 
 
                                             
1 Ulrich Beck: A new cosmopolitanism is in the air, 2007 
http://www.signandsight.com/features/1603.html and Nation-state politics can only fail the problems of 
the modern world  http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jan/15/politics.eu  
2 Bernard-Henri Lévy, American talk of the death of French culture says more about them than us, 2007 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/dec/08/france.international  
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To what extent is the “staging” that these phenomena exemplify necessary in order to 
act or argue politically?  For one’s initial reaction, in both the case of the hustings and 
that of the European academics (but neither are simply academics; they are both 
closely intertwined in a tightly knit political and economic arena), is to think of the 
stage within a stage of Hamlet and worry with the guilty Queen that there is a little too 
much protesting going on.  For if, indeed, the United States is unified; if, indeed, two 
hundred or so years of nation-building had achieved the success of citizens belonging 
without question to the nation-state of America; what would be the rhetorical and 
political value of repeatedly proclaiming it?   If Europe, in its political differences and 
the labyrinthine political structures to which it has given rise, is secure as an “entity” 
vis-à-vis the States, Asia and Russia, then what would be the need to contrast, with 
Beck, such a political entity with its others, and proclaim a new and – the argument 
appears to go - universal structuring which is well-nigh bound to advance in its inherent 
superiority over other political structures?  If there is an exemplary culture of France 
(exemplary not so much in its high quality – for Lévy questions this - but rather in its 
lack of translatability to an Anglo-Saxon method of assessment), then why would one 
of the principal philosophers of the French state need to defend it against an 
(ostensibly popularist) article in Time magazine? 
 
The worry regarding too much protestation is already in play in at least one of these 
articles.  Lévy states that the “ultimate message” – “a secret one, and in code” - of the 
Time article is not the concrete criticism of French culture, nor the underlying simplistic 
implications of that criticism (which he outlines in five “axioms”), but rather that “what 
really strikes one is the nervousness of the tone.  It is this desire to prove too much 
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which inevitably, as Nietzsche says, exhausts truth.”   However, this meta-awareness 
of a structure, need or necessity to “prove too much”, of protesting too much, does 
not appear to save Lévy from the fate of being hoist by his own petard: even a co-
European critique of his piece might question whether the evocation of Nietzsche in 
respect of a Time article which asks its readers: “Quick: name a French pop star who 
isn't Johnny Hallyday'” is not to be using a sledge-hammer to crack a rather small nut. 
 
Beck’s thesis is that of a cosmopolitan European Union engaged in the active process 
of transcending the outmoded idea of a unified national state.  It thereby divorces the 
notions of “state” and “nation” from each other, and thus is setting the scene for the 
necessarily cosmopolitan politics of the 21st century, just as the Peace of Westphalia 
separated the church and state in the 17th century and thus brought religious tolerance 
to Europe (according to Beck’s argument, which can certainly be disputed).  This 
stance is contrasted to that of the States which, it is claimed, is wedded still to a 
“nationalism – a rigid adherence to the position that world political meta power games 
are and must remain national ones”.  There is an implied set of philosophical 
differences which Beck applies across this divide.  On the side of “nationalism” and the 
state regarded as a unity is the outmoded philosophy of “the same”, of the object 
secure in its identity as a criteria of effective action and thought, an associated lack of 
ambiguity in analysis, and the subsuming of differences and relativity to an 
essentialising discourse.  The side of cosmopolitanism by contrast represents indirectly 
the 1960s philosophies of difference of (amongst others) Deleuze (Difference and 
Repetition, 1967) and Derrida (Différance, 1967), derived in turn from a post-
Nietzschian or post-Heideggarian distrust of the notion of the  object, secure in its 
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identity, as a criteria of final knowledge.  But the reduction of the argument - and more 
importantly the political realities of Europe, the States and other nation-states – to this 
philosophical distinction between ontologies of the same and of difference is surely a 
caricature of more complex political realities. 
 
Empirically, we could ask whether it so sure that the United States represents an 
unequivocal “nation state”, and whether the European Union has so clearly departed 
from the same project.  What of the currents within both which run counter to Beck’s 
argument?  Philosophically, we could recall that Deleuze’s expands the realm of 
“difference” to the point where all notions of the same are derived from it, not vice-
versa.  In other words, the philosophy of difference does not allow any primary 
sameness from which difference could be derived by way of a contrast between two 
things.  Difference “comes first” and identity is derived.  This, says Deleuze, is the 
“profound” message of Nietzsche’s eternal return of the same3.  It means in turn that 
the field of analysis is, in the ultimate case, not a field of similar items but rather a 
chaos from which “disorders” can be fictionalised by the workings of the novelist-
analyst-clinician.  This analogy we take from Deleuze: 
 
There is always a great deal of art involved in the grouping of symptoms, in the 
organisation of a table where a particular symptom is dissociated from another… 
and forms the new figure of a disorder or illness.  Clinicians who… renew a 
symptomatological table produce a work of art; conversely, artists are 
clinicians…. of civilisation.  It seems, moreover, that an evaluation of symptoms 
might only be achieved through a novel.”  4 
 
                                             
3 see Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy and Difference and Repetition 
4 Deleuze, G Logic of Sense section 33  
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Thus, on this reading, an ultimate analysis of the difference between the States and 
Europe, and the effectiveness of a European cosmopolitanism, would need to remain 
faithful to a doubt as to the coherence of the phenomena being discussed.  In other 
words, if Beck is championing a philosophy of difference over that of the same, is it so 
clear that the unequivocal deployment of the tool of “sameness” (the States is thus; 
Europe is thus) is appropriate? 
 
Our argument here is that what is occurring in each of these political fields (the Time 
magazine article; Lévy’s criticism of it; the evocation of American unity and 
belongingness in the hustings; and Beck’s championing of European cosmopolitanism) 
is the use of a necessary staging, and a necessary and inescapable prejudice. 
 
We can argue the inescapability of prejudice from a number of positions (and these are 
not the only ones): 
 
1. Marc Augé, in Non-places  - introduction to an anthropology of supermodernity5, 
in a book which at the outset appears to be a critique of modern denuded 
notions of space, points to a structural character of anthropological studies (as 
evinced by Mauss and Lévi-Strauss, but common to all anthropology as a 
scientific discipline) when he states that “behind the ideas of totality and 
localized society there clearly lies another: that of consistency or transparency 
between culture, society and individual” (49), which results in an obvious 
limitation: “to substantify a singular culture is to ignore its intrinsically 
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problematic character” (50), a limitation he refers to as the “ethnological 
illusion” (51).  Thus a critique of the modern non-place (airports, suburbia, malls 
etc) comes to call into question the very notion of authentic “place” (the 
culturally unambiguous meaningful place posited by anthropological studies of 
other cultures) which was used to contrast to (and therefore construct) this 
supposed “non-place”.  We point, however, to the necessity of this ethnological 
illusion or prejudice in its two-fold result.  Augé does not claim that 
anthropology could (or should) be cured of this “failing”; he acknowledges that 
it is this prejudice which enables the discipline to arise in the first place and 
which allows it to learn, to discover, to posit internal theories and to record 
empirical results.  These results are two-fold.  On the one hand, explicit: the 
prejudice or illusion of a substantive, singular culture enables matters to be 
stated about that culture.  On the other hand, implicit: that same prejudice 
implies and generates discourses about the culture from which the 
anthropologist hails. 
 
2. Quine, in his seminal essay Ontological Relativity6, posits the inevitable use of 
background theories, frames of references and coordinate systems in order to 
explicate and locate whatever foreground theory is in use.  In determining what 
objects we wish to study, we must have reference back to a “background 
theory” which in turn gives the criteria for object-like status.  In other words, 
put in the terms we have already used, in order to state something about an 
                                                                                                                                         
5 Augé, M, Non-places  - introduction to an anthropology of supermodernity trans J Howe.  London: Verso, 
1995 [original: Non-lieux, Introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité 1992.] 
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object of study, we must use a “prejudice” – a pre-defined background – ie 
these “background theories”.  Now, for Quine as a positivist philosopher, there 
can be no “prior philosophy” (26) outside the “natural sciences”, which provides 
the ultimate foundation of all valid analysis.  None the less, he states that: “ As 
for the ontology in turn of the background theory… these matters can call for a 
background theory in turn” (67).   This implies regress, since the background 
theory in turn falls to be explicated in terms of another, and so forth; and we 
can see that taken to the limit, we are confronted with an abyssal situation 
where, in order to make valid statements, we must dispose arguably unfounded 
prejudices (ie background theories not yet explicated on the basis of another 
deeper one). 
 
3. Gadamer, in Truth and Method7, in his re-evaluation of the epistemology of the 
enlightenment, argues explicitly for the necessity of prejudice, in contrast to the 
enlightenment’s call for (and use of) the notion of knowledge deriving from the 
tabula rasa of first principles.  This structure of prejudice is an essential part of 
his hermeneutics (his theory, or perhaps more precisely ontology, of meaning), 
and derives from Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle outlined in the first part of 
Being and Time.  Heidegger outlined the essential “fore-structure” of the 
understanding – a structure which has structural affinities with Quine’s 
“background theories” – as a positive possibility of the finitude of human 
understanding.  This structure, however, gets deprecated by the enlightenment.  
                                                                                                                                         
6 Quine, WV, “Ontological Relativity” in Ontological Relativity and other Essay.  NY: Columbia University 
Press, 1969. [Original: a lecture given at Columbia from 1968.] 
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Gadamer states: “the fundamental prejudice of the enlightenment is the 
prejudice against prejudice itself”(240), and therefore argues that “the 
prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgements, constitute the 
historical reality of his being” (245).  Whatever doubts one may have about the 
political implications of Gadamer’s project and his rehabilitation of tradition in 
place of reason (thus legitimising prejudice in the temporal diachronic plane 
rather than the synchronic, as the enlightenment had done) the structural point 
is clear: in order to study any phenomena, in order to discuss and posit both 
objects and theories, the logic of necessary prejudice is inescapable.  One must 
have a background theory, a prejudice, a fore-structure of understanding or an 
ethnological (or other) illusion. 
 
This structural necessity of prejudice implies a logic of staging, of spectacle, of the 
construction of sameness and the desire for the repetition of the staging of this 
sameness.  Taking these in turn: 
 
• the moment of staging is the moment of foregrounding, of the creation of an 
object out of the background field of essential differences.  This is why Deleuze 
characterises the clinician who “invents” a disorder -  an illness - out of 
symptoms as a novelist, one who essential puts on stage, calls-forth the 
phenomena 
 
                                                                                                                                         
7 Gadamer, H-G, Truth and Method trans W Glen-Doepel.  London: Sheed and Ward, 1979.  [Original: 
Wahrheit und Methode 1962.] 
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• inevitably, this staging constitutes a spectacle – that which one looks at 
explicitly, curiously, as if within the frame of the photograph.  This moment of 
the spectacle may fall to be deprecated, whether it be from a conservative 
rhetoric of Heideggarian authenticity; or from a left-wing critique of the society 
of the spectacle and the spectacular character of capitalist economics and its 
associated globalisation.  However, its deprecation does not overcome its 
inescapability; and we might essay in the incessant worry about specularisation 
the nihilism which Nietzsche points to and which Deleuze interprets in Nietzsche 
and Philosophy, namely that habit of disparaging existent and finite life in the 
name of a transcendent or past superior reality- in this case, a supposedly more 
genuine culture unwedded to the repetition and seduction of the image 
 
• thus sameness, whether posited by or for friend or foe, is constructed.  The 
staging must be constructed.  It never falls untainted from the sky.  It is not 
supplied by nature or an ultimate authority.  It is thus, if needs be, 
deconstructable: that which is constructed is capable, by definition, of being 
deconstructed 
 
• hence an insistent repetition.  Hence an insistent logic, deployed across political 
(and other) spheres, of the “protestation too much”, of “proving too much”.   
We could say that the regressive logic of Quine’s background theories, 
potentially and abysally repeating to the limit, are countered (and must be 
countered) in environments where the question of identity and sameness is of 
critical importance (sometimes of life and death importance) by means of an 
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equally insistent repetition of staging, of calls to sameness, and constant 
reproduction.  The “replication of what is seen, known, done” may, according to 
this argument, derive not so much from an inauthentic relation to reality; nor 
from the infection of genuine existence by capitalism and the exigencies of the 
market; but from an inherent drive or habit which enables knowledge and allows 
the active establishment of things in the face of the movement of the abyss 
 
 
Where, then, does this leave any criteria of critique?  If Beck has no choice but to 
deploy a prejudice whereby Europe is the positive face of otherness as opposed the 
sameness of the nation-state supposedly exemplified by the United States; if Lévy‘s 
assertion of a “nervousness of tone” in respect of the States’ relation to France (and, 
by implication, all other cultures) is belied by the melodrama of its own Nietzschian 
über-protestation; if indeed Lévy could not, if he wished to say anything at all, escape 
something like this melodrama; from what non-relative position could they correct 
themselves or be corrected in turn? 
 
According to the logic of the arguments so far, we might suspect that, if there is a 
criteria of critique, it must, perforce, be a structural one and not a positional one.  That 
is, the device will depend not on the position from which it deploys itself, but the 
movement which it implies (whatever position it is taking).  Such a machine is already 
namely “critique” by Kant, where in Kritik der Reinen Vernunft he defines 
transcendence not in terms of a going beyond our existing conditions (ie, he does not 
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define it positionally) but in terms of a movement back towards that which is doing the 
analysis.  That is, a moment of self-relation or self-critique: 
 “I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with 
objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of 
knowledge is to be possible a priori”8 
 
Thus we might say that the critique of Beck and Lévy, and their caricaturing of the 
United States, would need to turn not on the arguments they are using but rather on 
their apparent lack of self-critique in using such a rhetoric of sameness and otherness.  
(We say apparent: we think it is likely that they make a conscious choice in this 
regard.)  Whether this is to deny them all political power, and all possibility of 
effectiveness - whether, in short, they are condemned (like their adversaries) either to 
propaganda or emasculation – is perhaps the key question facing global politics today. 
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8 Kant, I Critique of Pure Reason trans N Kemp Smith, 59 
